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Background to the debate: Only two industrialized countries, the United States and New Zealand, allow 
direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) of prescription 
medicines, although New Zealand is planning a ban [1]. The 
challenge for these governments is ensuring that DTCA is 
more beneﬁ cial than harmful. Proponents of DTCA argue 
that it helps to inform the public about available treatments 
and stimulates appropriate use of drugs for high-priority 
illnesses (such as statin use in people with ischemic heart 
disease). Critics argue that the information in the adverts 
is often biased and misleading, and that DTCA raises 
prescribing costs without net evidence of health beneﬁ ts.
Elizabeth Almasi and Randall Stafford’s 
Viewpoint: Pharmaceutical Advertising 
Might Produce a Valuable Placebo Effect
The impact of DTCA on patient expectations has important 
implications for evaluating its role in the health-care system. 
While these expectations can lead to inappropriate and 
excessive prescribing, they also may induce a placebo effect 
that might increase the clinical effectiveness of the advertised 
products. This seldom-discussed effect of DTCA should be 
taken into account in discussion of policy approaches to this 
form of marketing.
The placebo effect can be triggered by an array of stimuli, 
such as pills, doctors, and devices. The effect is profound: 
about one-third of patients report relief from postoperative 
pain, cough, headache, depression, and other conditions when 
given a placebo [2,3]. Surprisingly, the two models used to 
explain the placebo phenomenon are identical to the theories 
that lie behind the methodologies of consumer advertising. 
The ﬁ rst model, classical conditioning, is based on 
Pavlovian conditioning theory. According to this theory, prior 
experiences with effective medical treatments “condition” the 
patient to associate pills, syringes, and authoritative medical 
opinions with imminent pain relief, eliciting a response 
similar to the active agents [4]. Similarly, DTCA offers 
conditioned stimuli to associate each product with positive 
emotions: the joy of playing in beautiful ﬁ elds for allergy 
sufferers (loratadine commercial) or the relief conveyed by 
elderly patients with arthritis participating in their favorite 
activities (rofecoxib commercial). Patients who take the 
advertised medication may be conditioned to elicit the 
positive feelings that were portrayed in the advertisement, 
which could enhance the medication’s clinical effect. 
 The second theory to explain the placebo effect focuses 
on the expectancies formed from the information provided 
[5]. According to the expectancy-value theory, individuals 
are receptive to signals conﬁ rming their initial expectancies 
after administration of a placebo treatment. The ability 
for information alone to produce a conditioned response 
explains why patients taking a placebo often report the same 
side effects as patients taking the active medication: the 
reported or observed experience of others can elicit a placebo 
effect by creating the expectancy of an effect. Likewise, 
many pharmaceutical advertisements teach viewers what to 
expect from the medication to capitalize on this conditioned 
response [6]. Commercials for conditions such as high 
cholesterol and osteoporosis ﬁ rst assert that widely prevalent 
minor symptoms or unassessed biological parameters can 
have grave implications [7]. Then, the promoted drug is 
introduced as the solution, and the relief associated with the 
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An enhanced placebo response could 
improve patient adherence and 
outcomes.
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drug is depicted in the advertisement, teaching the viewer 
what to expect. 
These advertising strategies not only create consumer 
demand for the advertised products, but may also create 
the emotionally conditioned responses and expectancies 
instrumental to enhancing a placebo effect that occurs when 
the medication is taken. This conditioned response may 
increase the effectiveness of medications beyond that which is 
expected from their purely biological mechanisms.
Through the placebo effect, patients’ positive expectations 
from DTCA may potentially reduce the amount of treatment 
requested or required [8]. An enhanced placebo response 
also could improve patient adherence and outcomes [9]. 
To the extent that advertisements “reward” patients for 
the same actions that physicians recommend, patients may 
be more likely to follow treatment instructions [10]. In 
addition, physicians may facilitate a placebo response to 
the medications they prescribe by successfully borrowing 
strategies from DTCA. In fact, improved communication 
might result from personalizing the need for treatment, 
placing treatment beneﬁ ts in perspective relative to drug side 
effects, and providing testimonial examples of past treatment 
successes. In addition, where a rationale for a class effect 
exists, physicians may enhance the effect of generic drugs by 
pointing out their inherent similarities to highly advertised, 
brand name medications.
Patients’ heightened expectations also may motivate them 
to collaborate with their physicians, and thereby increase 
the quality of their care. Berger and colleagues suggest that 
patient expectation and physician perception of patient 
expectation for prescription medication correlate with the 
issuance of a prescription [11]. Kravitz et al. conﬁ rmed this 
hypothesis. Assuming that the request for a prescription 
signals a patient’s expectation, it is not surprising that in their 
study, standardized patients suffering from major depressive 
disorder who requested an antidepressant were much more 
likely to receive a prescription for antidepressants than 
patients who made no such request [12].
Yet these heightened expectations have been shown 
to increase treatment for all conditions, including those 
that may be marginally beneﬁ cial or even inappropriate. 
Kravitz et al. reported that standardized patients with 
adjustment disorder (a condition that is usually treated 
without medication) who made a request for a brand name 
antidepressant were ﬁ ve times more likely to receive a 
prescription for antidepressants, which, in this context, is “at 
the margin of clinical appropriateness” [12]. Heightened 
expectations may lead to inappropriate and costly demands 
for medications when evidence would dictate other 
medications or nonpharmacological interventions.
Optimal use of DTCA may require stricter guidelines on 
advertisements or more aggressive enforcement of current 
guidelines so that patients do not form unreasonable 
expectations. Diminishing the demand for inappropriate 
prescriptions would lessen the negative impacts of DTCA. 
Meanwhile, exposure to DTCA might, nonetheless, continue 
to improve health practices and outcomes through its ability 
to facilitate favorable clinical responses. By understanding 
the expectations that DTCA creates, physicians may limit the 
problems associated with DTCA, while harnessing this placebo 
effect to increase the effectiveness of prescribed treatment.
Richard Kravitz’s Viewpoint: Regulate, Don’t 
Ban—The Power of DTCA Should Be Harnessed 
for the Public Good
The opposing positions on DTCA of prescription drugs are 
well known. Proponents tend to focus on DTCA’s potential 
to educate consumers and encourage productive interchange 
between patients and physicians, while critics emphasize 
liabilities. In the US, reasoned discourse has nearly suffocated 
in an atmosphere thick with First Amendment objections (the 
First Amendment protects the right to free speech) served 
up by lawyers for Big Pharma and, on the opposing side, the 
occasional anticorporate rant. 
A more dispassionate analysis would acknowledge three 
facts. First, prescription drug costs are rising rapidly—based 
on a conﬂ uence of increased prices, increased use of existing 
drugs, and introduction of new (more expensive) drugs, 
many of which are promoted directly to the consumer [13].
Second, some drugs are clearly overprescribed. 
(Overprescribing at the level of the individual implies that 
the beneﬁ ts of taking the drug do not clearly outweigh 
the risks.) Overuse has been seen with antibiotics for viral 
upper respiratory track infections [14]; antihistamines, 
benzodiazepines, and sedative-hypnotics in the elderly [15]; 
inhaled beta-adrenergic agonists in children who are not taking 
“controller medications” for asthma [16]; neuromodulators 
for chronic pain [17]; and sildenaﬁ l and ﬂ uoxetine for 
augmentation of normal sexual and psychological functioning, 
respectively [18]. The role of DTCA in promoting such overuse 
is unclear, although there is little question that advertising 
lowers the clinical threshold for prescribing. 
Third, there is substantial underuse of some prescription 
drugs in the US. On a population basis, underuse of effective 
therapies may cause more deaths per year than overuse [19]. 
Examples of underprescribed drugs include beta-blockers 
following myocardial infarction, angiotensin-converting 
enzyme inhibitors in congestive heart failure, adjuvant 
hormonal or chemotherapy following breast cancer surgery, 
prophylactic antibiotics prior to joint-replacement surgery, 
and warfarin in patients with atrial ﬁ brillation. 
Given that some drugs are underused and others overused, 
an intervention such as DTCA that increases prescribing 
could have beneﬁ cial effects, deleterious effects, or both. 
While logically coherent, this conclusion could not until 
recently claim much empirical support. A recent trial provides 
strong evidence that DTCA—like the prescription drugs it 
promotes—has both therapeutic and toxic effects [12]. 
The investigators trained actors (“standardized patients,” 
[SPs]) to portray patients with major depression of moderate 
severity (a serious condition requiring treatment, referral, or 
close follow-up) or with adjustment disorder (a less serious 
DTCA is neither good nor evil; 
it is both.
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condition in which supportive counseling and watchful waiting 
might sufﬁ ce). SPs were randomly assigned to visit 152 primary-
care physicians in three US cities (298 visits in all). In one-third 
of visits, the actresses (all non-Hispanic, white, middle-aged 
women) mentioned a TV advertisement and made a brand-
speciﬁ c request for Paxil (paroxetine); in another one-third 
of visits, they made a general request for “medicine that might 
help”; and in the rest of the visits they made no request. 
There were two main ﬁ ndings. First, among SPs presenting 
with major depression, SPs making no request had only a 56% 
chance of receiving high-quality initial care (antidepressant 
prescription, mental health referral, or close follow-up). 
In contrast, SPs making a brand-speciﬁ c or general request 
for medication were treated to this high standard of care 
in 90% of visits. That’s good news, because it suggests that 
informed, motivated, and involved patients can dramatically 
improve the quality of their own care. Second, among 
SPs presenting with adjustment disorder, the proportion 
receiving an antidepressant prescription was 55% if a brand-
speciﬁ c request was made, 39% if a general request was 
made, and 10% if no request was made. That’s not so good, 
because it means that requests associated with consumer drug 
advertisements could lead to lots of prescriptions at the very 
margins of clinical appropriateness.
In general, DTCA is most likely to deliver public health 
beneﬁ ts when the condition to be treated is serious and when 
the treatment is safe, effective, and underused. DTCA will 
tend to deliver net harms when the condition is mild or trivial 
and when the treatment is potentially dangerous, marginally 
effective, or overused. DTCA—or a social marketing 
campaign modeled on it—could be an extremely effective way 
of encouraging patients with a recent myocardial infarction 
to take aspirin, beta-blockers, or an HMG-CoA-reductase 
inhibitor (statin). On the other hand, with health-care costs 
spiraling out of control, it is hard to justify multimillion-dollar 
advertising campaigns touting drugs for baldness, toenail 
fungus, and overactive bladder. For obvious reasons, drug 
companies are not stepping forward with advertisements for 
the (often generic) medicines that are truly underused. 
The question for US policymakers is not whether DTCA 
should be banned, but how can its beneﬁ ts be maximized 
and risks minimized within our free enterprise system. Two 
policy initiatives hold special promise. A two-year moratorium 
on DTCA of new drugs, coupled with a requirement for 
systematic postmarketing surveillance, could avoid another 
Vioxx tragedy, in which drug marketing got well ahead of the 
science. In addition, the tax system could be used to create 
incentives for public–private consortia to produce mass media 
campaigns aimed at educating patients about common, 
serious medical conditions, and encouraging them to take 
evidence-based therapies.
DTCA is neither good nor evil; it is both. A little regulatory 
ingenuity could harness the enormous power of DTCA or 
DTCA-like public service announcements to improve the 
public health.
Peter Mansﬁ eld’s Viewpoint: There’s a Better 
Way than DTCA
The collective evidence on DTCA suggests that it may 
have some beneﬁ ts, but there is stronger evidence of harms 
(http:⁄⁄www.healthyskepticism.org/library/topics/dtca.
php) [20,21]. Greater beneﬁ t could be gained, with less 
harm, from publicly funded health information and 
promotion [22].
DTCA is limited to drugs that are proﬁ table to advertise: 
mostly expensive, new drugs for long-term use for common 
indications. Such advertising increases premature rapid 
uptake and overuse of new drugs before ﬂ aws, including 
safety problems, have been discovered and communicated to 
health professionals [21,23,24]. Many new drugs are inferior 
to older treatments, and over two-thirds are no better but 
are often more expensive [25]. Increased use of new drugs 
stimulated by DTCA can lead to adverse events directly 
(for example, cardiovascular events associated with COX-2 
selective inhibitors, which were heavily advertised to the US 
public) [23,26,27] or indirectly, by diverting resources from 
more cost-effective interventions. 
DTCA rarely focuses on, and tends to drown out, high-
priority public health messages about diet, exercise, 
addictions, social involvement, equity, pollution, climate 
change, and appropriate use of older drugs. Older drugs 
are less proﬁ table to advertise because a share of the sales 
stimulated goes to generic competition. Consequently, DTCA 
for any currently advertised drug will become less proﬁ table 
after expiry of patent protection from competition.When 
DTCA no longer provides competitive return on investment, 
it is stopped. Consequently, if there are any beneﬁ ts from 
current DTCA (such as stimulating new requests for statins 
after a myocardial infarction), those beneﬁ ts will be for a 
limited time only. 
DTCA aims to persuade rather than to inform, and 
there is evidence that it is effective at persuasion [12,21]. 
Content analyses of DTCA have found that the information 
provided is usually ﬂ awed and incomplete [28–32]. Examples 
include a study of 320 drug advertisements in popular 
US magazines that found that the advertisements rarely 
provided information about success rates of treatment or 
alternative treatments [32], and a study of 23 US television 
advertisements for prescription drugs that found that the 
majority gave more time to beneﬁ ts than to risks [28]. 
Such advertising can lead some people to falsely believe 
they are well informed, so it reduces their motivation to 
search for more reliable information. Finding reliable 
information is already difﬁ cult (like ﬁ nding a needle in a 
haystack) and the “noise” of DTCA just makes the haystack 
larger. 
Advertising drugs to the public often works by creating 
or exacerbating unhappiness or anxiety about symptoms or 
normal experiences (such as occasional erectile difﬁ culties), 
and by creating high expectations of beneﬁ t from drugs. 
The combination of heightened unhappiness and high 
expectations can cause severe distress when a drug is 
unaffordable or when its effects are disappointing: for 
example, a qualitative study of men who used sildenaﬁ l for 
erectile dysfunction found that expectations raised by media 
hyperbole had an adverse effect on the morale of those for 
whom it was ineffective [33]. 
DTCA may have negative economic, 
social, and political consequences.
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DTCA is often ambiguous and widens the indications 
beyond those for which the promoted drugs are worthwhile. 
For example, DTCA may have contributed to increasing 
unjustiﬁ ed use of antidepressants for young people [34,35].
DTCA may also have negative economic, social, and 
political consequences. For example, by increasing use of 
expensive drugs and increasing adverse events [21,23,24], 
DTCA increases taxpayer, insurance, and individual costs, 
which in turn can harm individual, familial, and national 
economies. The heavy costs of DTCA contribute to higher 
drug prices and are a hurdle for market entry of new 
competition. Revenue from DTCA creates a conﬂ ict of 
interest for media companies, because such advertising can 
undermine the media’s freedom to report critically on the 
drug industry. DTCA can have a distorting effect on people’s 
perceptions of health and disease, including promoting the 
medicalization of conditions that are within the spectrum 
of normality [36]. DTCA sometimes persuades people to 
interpret distress as signifying individual illness rather than 
social or political problems to be solved. DTCA pushes a 
“Brave New World” where if “anything unpleasant should 
somehow happen, why, there’s always [the sedative] soma to 
give you a holiday from the facts. And there’s always soma to 
calm your anger, to reconcile you to your enemies, to make 
you patient and long-suffering” [37].
There are two root causes of the problems with DTCA. 
The ﬁ rst is payment systems that reward drug companies for 
increasing sales of expensive drugs regardless of the impact 
on health. These systems should be redesigned [22,38]. The 
second root cause is normal human vulnerability to being 
mislead [39]. Few people have the time and advanced skills in 
drug evaluation, psychology, logic, economics, and semiotics, 
etc., required to evaluate drug promotion. Advertising can 
sneak in under the radar to inﬂ uence even skeptical people 
without their awareness. Ideas that would be rejected if 
given attention get reinforced by repetition. More research 
is needed to test the hypothesis that it is possible to learn 
how to gain more beneﬁ t than harm when exposed to drug 
promotion [40]. 
Almost all government, health professional, and consumer 
inquiries into DTCA have concluded that it causes net public 
harm [20,41]. It is too difﬁ cult to regulate DTCA, so I believe 
that the logical conclusion from the evidence is that the best 
option for improving overall health and wealth is to ban all 
types of DTCA, including “disease awareness” advertising 
[42]. Drug company Web sites and media releases should be 
regulated carefully.
The public would beneﬁ t from reliable information and 
health promotion focused on public health priorities. Such 
information can be provided at no extra cost by copying, 
improving, and expanding policies and programs that are 
already successful in many countries. Governments and 
insurance companies who subsidize drugs currently pay for 
biased promotion indirectly via high drug prices. Instead, these 
agencies could fund information, education, and promotional 
services focused on public health needs. Such investments pay 
for themselves by reducing health-care costs. Universities and 
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